The recall comes years after surgeons say they first noticed problems with the HeartMate II and HeartMate 3, manufactured by Thoratec Corp., a subsidiary of Abbott Laboratories. The devices are not currently being removed from the market. In an emailed response, Abbott said it had communicated the risk to customers this year.

The delayed action raises questions for some safety advocates about how and when issues with approved medical devices should be reported. The heart devices in question have been associated with thousands of reports of patients’ injuries and deaths, as described in a ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News investigation late last year.

“Why doesn’t the public know?” said , a cardiologist and an expert in medical device safety and regulation at the University of California-San Francisco. Though some surgeons may have been aware of issues, others, particularly those who do not implant the device frequently, may have been in the dark. “And their patients are suffering adverse events,” he said.

The recall involves a pair of mechanical pumps that help the heart pump blood when it can’t do so on its own. The devices, small enough to fit in the palm of a hand, are implanted in patients with end-stage heart failure who are waiting for a transplant or as a permanent solution when a transplant is not an option. The recall affects nearly 14,000 devices.

Amanda Hils, an FDA press officer, said the agency is working with Abbott to investigate the reported injuries and deaths and determine if further action is needed.

“To date, the number of deaths reported appears consistent with the ,” Hils said in an email.

According to the FDA’s recall notice, the devices can cause buildup of “biological material” that reduces their ability to help the heart circulate blood and keep patients alive. The buildup accumulates gradually and can appear two years or more after a device is implanted in a patient’s chest.

Doctors were advised to watch out for “low-flow alarms” on the devices and, if they do diagnose the obstruction, to either monitor the patient or perform surgery to implant a stent, release the blockage, or replace the pump. “Rates of outflow obstruction are low,” Abbott spokesperson Justin Paquette said in an email, adding that patients whose devices are functioning normally “have no reason for concern.”

A review of the FDA device database shows at least 130 reports related to HeartMate II or 3 that mention the complication reported by regulators. The earliest such report filed with the FDA dates to at least 2020, according to a ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News review of the database.

Monday’s alert is the second Class 1 recall of a HeartMate device this year.

In January, Abbott issued an urgent “” to hospitals about in which the HeartMate 3 unintentionally starts and stops due to the pump’s communication system, which cardiologists use to assess patients’ status. The FDA in March.

In February, Abbott issued to hospitals about the blockage problem, asking them to inform physicians, complete and return an acknowledgment form, and pay attention to low-flow alarms on the device’s monitor that may indicate an obstruction. The company said in the letter that it is working on “a design solution” to prevent the blockages.

A in the Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery reported the obstruction in about 3% of cases, though the incidence rate was higher the longer a patient had the device.

The only other Class 1 was in May 2018, when the company issued corrective action notices to hospitals and physicians warning that the graft line that carries blood from the pump to the aorta could twist and stop blood flow.

The FDA recall notice issued Monday includes to diagnose the blockage using an algorithm to detect obstructions and, if needed, a CT angiogram to verify the cause.

At present, the HeartMate 3, which was first approved by the FDA in 2017, is the only medical option for many patients with end-stage heart failure and who do not qualify for a transplant. The HeartMate 3 has supplanted the HeartMate II, which received FDA approval in 2008.

If the new recall leads to the device being removed from the market, end-stage heart failure patients could have no options, said , a cardiothoracic surgeon at the University of Michigan who also oversees a proprietary database of HeartMate II and HeartMate 3 implants.

If that happens, “we are in trouble,” Pagani said. “It would be devastating to the patients to not have this option. It’s not a perfect option — no pump ever is — but this is as good as it’s ever been.”

It’s not known precisely how many patients have received a HeartMate II or HeartMate 3 implant. That information is proprietary. The FDA recall notices show worldwide distribution of more than and more than .

The blockage complication may have gone unreported to the public for so long partly because physicians are not required to report adverse events to federal regulators, said Madris Kinard, a former FDA medical device official and founder of , a company that makes FDA device data more user-friendly for hospitals, law firms, and investors.

Only device manufacturers, device importers, and hospitals are to report device-related injuries, deaths, and significant malfunctions to the FDA.

“If this is something physicians were aware of, but they weren’t mandated to report to the FDA,” Kinard said, “at what point does that communication between those two groups need to happen?”

Dhruva, the cardiologist, said he is looking for transparency from Abbott about what the company is doing to address the problem so he can have more thorough conversations with patients considering a HeartMate device.

“We’re going to expect to have some data saying, ‘Hey we created this fix, and this fix works, and it doesn’t cause a new problem.’ That’s what I want to know,” he said. “There’s just a ton more that I feel in the dark about, to be honest, and I’m sure that patients and their families do as well.”

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One member of the FDA advisory committee was linked to hundreds of payments from Abbott totaling almost $200,000, according to a database maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services. Another was connected to 100 payments totaling about $100,000 and conducted research supported by about $50,000 from Abbott. A third member of the committee worked on research supported by more than $180,000 from the company.

The government database, called “,” records financial relationships between doctors and certain other health care providers and the makers of drugs and medical devices. ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News found records of Abbott payments associated with 10 of the 14 voting members of the FDA advisory panel, which was weighing clinical evidence for a heart device called TriClip G4 System. The money, paid from 2016 through 2022 — the most recent year for which the database shows payments — adds up to about $650,000.

The panel voted almost unanimously that the benefits of the device outweigh its risks. Abbott announced on April 2 that the FDA had approved TriClip, which is designed to treat leakage from the heart’s tricuspid valve.

The Abbott payments illustrate the reach of medical industry money and the limits of transparency at the FDA. They also shed light on how the agency weighs relationships between people who serve on its advisory panels and the makers of drugs and medical devices that those committees review as part of the regulatory approval process.

The payments do not reflect wrongdoing on the part of the agency, its outside experts, or the device manufacturer. The database does not show that any of the payments were related directly to the TriClip device.

But some familiar with the process, including people who have served on FDA advisory committees, said the payments should have been disclosed at the Feb. 13 meeting — if not as a regulatory requirement, then in the interest of transparency, because the money might call into question committee members’ objectivity.

“This is a problem,” Joel Perlmutter, a former FDA advisory committee member and a professor of neurology at Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, said by email. “They should or must disclose this due to bias.”

The records several kinds of payments from drug and device makers. One category, called “associated research funding,” supports research in which a physician is named a principal investigator in the database. Another category, called “general payments,” includes consulting fees, travel expenses and meals connected to physicians in the database. The money can flow from manufacturers to third parties, such as hospitals, universities, or other corporate entities, but the database explicitly connects doctors by name to the payments.

At the to consider the TriClip device, an FDA official announced that committee members had been screened for potential financial conflicts of interest and found in compliance with government requirements.

FDA spokesperson Audra Harrison said by email that the agency doesn’t comment on matters related to individual advisory committee members.

“The FDA followed all appropriate procedures and regulations in vetting these panel members and stands firmly by the integrity of the disclosure and vetting processes in place,” she said. “This includes ensuring advisory committee members do not have, or have the appearance of, a conflict of interest.”

Abbott “has no influence over who is selected to participate in FDA advisory committees,” a spokesperson for the company, Brent Tippen, said in a statement.

Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research, a think tank, said the FDA shouldn’t have allowed recipients of funding from Abbott in recent years to sit in judgment of the Abbott product. The agency takes too narrow a view of what should be disqualifying, she said.

One committee member was Craig Selzman, chief of the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery at the University of Utah. The Open Payments database connects to Selzman about $181,000 in associated research funding from Abbott to the University of Utah Hospitals & Clinics.

Asked in an interview if a reasonable person could question the impartiality of committee members based on the Abbott payments, Selzman said: “People from the outside looking in would probably say yes.”

He noted that Abbott’s money went to the university, not to him personally. Participating in industry-funded clinical trials benefits doctors professionally, he said. He added: “There’s probably a better way to provide transparency.”

The FDA has a history of appointing people to advisory committees who had relationships with manufacturers of the products under review. For example, in 2020, the doctor who chaired an FDA advisory committee had been a Pfizer consultant.

Appearance Issues

FDA advisory committee candidates, selected to provide expert advice on often complicated drug and device applications, must complete a confidential disclosure report that asks about current and past financial interests as well as “anything that would give an ‘appearance’ of a conflict.”

The FDA has discretion to decide whether someone with an “appearance issue” can serve on a panel, according to a guidance document posted on the agency’s website. Relationships more than a year in the past generally don’t give rise to appearance problems, according to the document, unless they suggest close ties to a company or involvement with the product under review. The main question is whether financial interests would cause a reasonable person to question the member’s impartiality, the document says.

The FDA draws a distinction between appearance issues and financial conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest occur when someone chosen to serve on an advisory committee has financial interests that “may be impacted” by their work on the committee, says.

If the FDA finds a conflict of interest but still wants the applicant on a panel, it can issue a public waiver. None of the panelists voting on TriClip received a waiver.

The FDA’s approach to disclosure contrasts with at which doctors earn credit for continuing medical education. For example, for a recent conference in Boston on technology for treatment of heart failure, including TriClip, the group holding the meeting directed speakers to include in their slide presentations disclosures .

Those disclosures — naming companies from which speakers had received consulting fees, grant support, travel expenses, and the like — also appeared on the conference website.

‘Unbridled Enthusiasm’

The FDA has designated TriClip a “breakthrough” device with “the potential to provide more effective treatment or diagnosis of a life-threatening or irreversibly debilitating disease” compared with current treatments, an agency official, Megan Naber, .

Naber said that for breakthrough devices, the “totality of data must still provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness” but the FDA “may be willing to accept greater uncertainty” about the balance of risks and benefits.

In a for the advisory committee, FDA staff pointed out findings from a clinical trial that didn’t reflect well on TriClip. For example, patients treated with TriClip had “numerically higher” mortality and heart failure hospitalization rates during the 12 months after the procedure compared with a control group, according to the report. Tippen, the Abbott spokesperson, didn’t respond to a request for comment on those findings.

The committee voted 14-0 that TriClip was safe for its intended use. The panel voted 12-2 that the device was effective, and it voted 13-1 that the benefits of TriClip outweighed the risks.

The committee member to whom the database attributes the most money from Abbott, Paul Hauptman, cast one of the votes against the device on effectiveness and the sole vote against the device on the bottom-line question of its risks versus benefits.

Hauptman said during the meeting that the question of safety was “very, very clear” but added: “I just felt the need to pull back a little bit on unbridled enthusiasm.” Who will benefit from the device, he said, “needs better definition.”

Hauptman, dean of the University of Nevada-Reno School of Medicine, is connected to 268 general payments from Abbott in the Open Payments database. Some payments are listed as going to an entity called Keswick Cardiovascular.

Hauptman said in an email that he followed FDA guidance and added, “My impartiality speaks for itself based on my vote and critical comments.”

Some committee members voted in favor of the device despite concerns.

Marc Katz, chief of the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery at the Medical University of South Carolina, is linked to 77 general about $53,000 from Abbott and worked on research supported by about $10,000 from the company, according to Open Payments.

“I voted yes for safety, no for effectiveness, but then caved and voted yes for the benefits outweighing the risks,” he said in the meeting.

In an email, he said of his Abbott payments: “All was disclosed and reviewed by the FDA.” He said that he “can be impartial” and that he “openly expressed … concerns about the treatment.”

Mitchell Krucoff, a professor at Duke University School of Medicine, is connected to 100 general about $105,000. Some went to a third party, HPIC Consulting. He also worked on research supported by about $51,000 from Abbott, according to Open Payments.

He said during the meeting that he voted in favor of the device on all three questions and added that doctors have “a lot to learn” once it’s on the market. For instance: By using the device to treat patients now, “do we set people up for catastrophes later?”

In an email, Krucoff said he completed a “very thorough conflict of interest screening by FDA for this panel,” which focused not only on Abbott but also on “any work done/payments received from any other manufacturer with devices in this space.”

John Hirshfeld Jr., an emeritus professor of medicine at the University of Pennsylvania, is linked by the database to six general payments from Abbott . Two of the payments linked to him went to a nonprofit, the Cardiovascular Research Foundation, according to the database. He voted yes on all three questions about TriClip but said at the meeting that he “would have liked to have seen more rigorous data to support efficacy.”

In an email, Hirshfeld said he disclosed the payments to the FDA. The agency did not deem him to have a conflict because he had no stake in Abbott’s success and his involvement with the company had ended, he said. Through the conflict-of-interest screening process, he said, he had been excluded from prior advisory panels.

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• This Dental Device Was Sold to Fix Patients’ Jaws. Lawsuits Claim It Wrecked Their Teeth. Mar 1, 2023
• Watch: Dental Device at Center of Lawsuits Was Used on Patients Without FDA Review Mar 2, 2023
• Feds Launch Criminal Investigation Into ‘AGGA’ Dental Device and Its Inventor Apr 12, 2023

Steve Galella, the inventor of the Anterior Growth Guidance Appliance, or “AGGA,” has said in court depositions that his device had been used on about 10,000 patients, and that he trained many dentists to use the AGGA in classes around the U.S. and overseas.

At least 23 patients, some of whom described being desperate for relief from sleep apnea or temporomandibular joint disorder (TMJ), have sued Galella in recent years claiming that the AGGA damaged their mouths and, in some cases, caused tooth loss. Galella denied wrongdoing in those lawsuits and has settled almost all of them within the past few months.

Galella was deposed before he settled the largest of those lawsuits. According to a recently obtained by ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News and CBS News, Galella said under oath that he had not represented that the AGGA could treat or cure TMJ or sleep apnea.

Video footage tells a different story.

Galella repeatedly references treating TMJ and sleep apnea patients with the AGGA, sometimes in conjunction with other devices, in footage from a training session he led with Australian dentists in 2017, which was produced in discovery in an AGGA lawsuit.

At one point in the footage, Galella can be seen displaying two versions of the AGGA to the dentists, pointing to one he says is preferred by “TMJ and sleep patients” — and then saying, “And I give it to them.”

“Can you cure TMJ? Yes,” Galella , according to the footage. “Can you cure mild to moderate sleep apnea? Yes.”

The AGGA, which Galella recently rebranded as the Osseo-Restoration Appliance, resembles a retainer and uses springs to apply pressure to the front teeth and upper palate, according to a patent application filed in 2021. This year, after a joint investigation by ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News and CBS News reported allegations of patients harmed by the AGGA, the FDA and the Department of Justice opened investigations into the device.

Dentists across the country have promoted the AGGA on their websites, often claiming it can “grow,” “remodel,” or “expand” an adult’s jaw without surgery, sometimes saying it has the potential to make patients more attractive and to treat common ailments like TMJ and sleep apnea, which afflict millions of Americans. Galella has said in depositions and video footage that the AGGA causes the bones in an adult’s jaw to “remodel” forward, reshaping their face.

The 2017 video footage contains other examples of Galella teaching dentists to treat TMJ and sleep apnea patients with the AGGA, which he sometimes calls a “growth appliance.” In one segment, he describes using a growth appliance on “nine out of 10” of his TMJ patients. In another instance, Galella presents photos of what he says is a TMJ patient, then proceeds to describe how he treated them with an AGGA while showing photos of the patient’s device and saying: “It’s easy with this appliance.” The footage also shows Galella calling a growth appliance “the cure” for sleep apnea, and he later says in reference to sleep apnea that “with a growth appliance, yeah, you can fix it.”

When Galella was confronted with this video footage during his recent deposition, he said his statements had been taken “out of context,” according to the deposition transcript.

The AGGA plaintiffs alleged in their lawsuits not that Galella treated them directly but instead that he or his company consulted with their dentists and prepared AGGA “treatment plans” for each patient.

Galella said during his deposition he had reviewed more than 12,000 treatment plans but said he’d never seen one that used the AGGA to treat TMJ or sleep apnea, according to the transcript. In the AGGA lawsuits, about a , and some of those plans list the patient’s “chief complaint” as TMJ or sleep apnea.

Galella’s attorneys did not respond to multiple recent requests for comment, and Galella declined to be interviewed when approached in person in February. One of Galella’s attorneys, Alan Fumuso, said in a written statement in February that the AGGA “is safe and can achieve beneficial results” when used properly.

The ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News-CBS News investigation of the AGGA was based on interviews with 11 people who said they were hurt by the device and dental specialists who said they’d witnessed severe complications in AGGA patients. The investigation found no record of the AGGA being registered with the FDA and no peer-reviewed evidence showing the device “expands” or “remodels” the jaw as Galella and other dentists have claimed.

“The entire concept of this device, of this treatment, makes zero sense,” said Kasey Li, a maxillofacial surgeon and sleep apnea specialist who has . “It doesn’t grow the jaw. It doesn’t widen the jaw. It just pushes the teeth out of their original position.”

In the wake of the ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News-CBS News investigation, the FDA announced it was “” about the AGGA and a similar device, the Anterior Remodeling Appliance. The agency said the devices had been used to treat TMJ and sleep apnea even though they were not cleared by the FDA and their safety and effectiveness had not been established.

Weeks later, the criminal investigation into the AGGA was disclosed in court filings by Galella and device manufacturer Johns Dental Laboratories, who said the U.S. attorney’s office in Memphis, Tennessee, was “potentially bringing criminal charges” against them. In another court filing, Johns Dental provided a copy of a grand jury subpoena seeking a wide variety of AGGA documents, including “any complaints received from any source whatsoever regarding the AGGA.”

Since then, Galella has resolved lawsuits from at least 19 AGGA plaintiffs through out-of-court settlements without any public admission of fault. Additional AGGA lawsuits were filed in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Washington, with all plaintiffs alleging they were harmed while being treated for TMJ or sleep apnea.

Alice Runion, a 30-year-old IT consultant living outside Indianapolis, alleged in one of those lawsuits that wearing an AGGA as part of her TMJ treatment resulted in “permanent impairment and disfigurement” and “caused severe damage to the roots of [her] teeth.”

In an interview, Runion added that the AGGA caused lingering migraines that have left her unable to work on a computer for long stretches, forcing her out of her job. Runion said that even after corrective jaw surgery that cost tens of thousands of dollars, some of her teeth may still be at risk.

“My surgeon and my health care providers have told me that it is possible that I could lose teeth in the future still because of the treatment I received,” Runion said.

The AGGA is also being studied by orthodontists Neal Kravitz and Jeffrey Miller, who said they intend to publish a research paper next year on how the device hurts patients. Miller, who has been a paid consultant for some AGGA plaintiffs, said he has examined dental scans from at least 30 patients who were “damaged” by the AGGA.

“It’s not difficult to see the pattern,” Miller said. “The patients lose bone that supports the housing of their teeth.”

Miller and Kravitz said that they bought an AGGA in May for their research and that the Department of Justice sent an official to photograph the unboxing of the device for the criminal investigation.

Miller and Kravitz added that Johns Dental was willing to sell them the AGGA only if they did not refer to the device by name while purchasing it. They provided ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News and CBS News with a copy of an email in which a Johns Dental employee writes: “To order the growth appliances from here on out, you’ll need to avoid using the names of those appliances or Dr. Galella’s name.”

A Johns Dental facility was inspected by the FDA in July, according to online inspection records. Those records show the company was pertaining to medical devices, but do not specifically mention the AGGA or any specific device. One citation was for an unspecified device whose “design history file does not demonstrate that the design was developed following the requirements” of federal law. Johns Dental declined to comment through its attorney, Jeffrey Oberlies.

Ten days after that FDA inspection, Johns Dental owner Jerry Neuenschwander was deposed in an AGGA lawsuit, court records show. He pleaded the Fifth in response to every question, according to a obtained by ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News and CBS News.

Spokespeople for the Justice Department and the FDA declined to comment on the AGGA. Attorneys for Neuenschwander did not respond to requests for comment.

CBS News producer Nicole Keller contributed to this report.

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Living with diabetes, Carlton “PeeWee” Gautney Jr. relied on a digital device about the size of a deck of playing cards to pump insulin into his bloodstream.

The pump, manufactured by device maker Medtronic, connected plastic tubing to an insulin reservoir, which Gautney set to release doses of the vital hormone over the course of the day. Gautney, a motorcycle enthusiast, worked as a dispatcher with the police department in Opp, Alabama.

The 59-year-old died suddenly on May 17, 2020, because — his family believes — the pump malfunctioned and delivered a fatal overdose of insulin.

“There’s a big hole left where he was,” said Gautney’s daughter, Carla Wiggins, who is suing the manufacturer. “A big part of me is missing.”

The wrongful-death lawsuit alleges the pump was “defective and unreasonably dangerous.” Medtronic has denied the pump caused Gautney’s death and filed a court motion for summary judgment, which is pending.

The pump Gautney depended on was among more than 400,000 Medtronic devices recalled, starting in November 2019, after the company said in a recall notice that damage to a retainer ring on the pump could “lead to an over or under delivery of insulin,” which could “be life threatening or may result in death.”

As the recall played out, federal regulators discovered that Medtronic had delayed acting — and warning patients of possible hazards with the pumps — despite amassing tens of thousands of complaints about the rings, government records show.

Over the past year, ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News has investigated medical device malfunctions including:

• Artificial knees manufactured by a Gainesville, Florida, company that remained on the market for more than 15 years despite packaging issues could have caused more than 140,000 of the implants to wear out prematurely.
• Metal inside patients who said in lawsuits that they required urgent surgery.
• Last-resort that FDA records state may have caused or contributed to thousands of patient deaths.
• And even a dental device, used on patients without FDA review, that lawsuits alleged has caused catastrophic harm to teeth and jawbones. CBS News co-reported and aired TV stories about the and devices.

The investigation has found that most medical devices, including many implants, are now cleared for sale by the FDA without tests for safety or effectiveness. Instead, manufacturers must simply show they have “substantial equivalence” to a product already in the marketplace — an approval process some experts view as vastly overused and fraught with risks.

“Patients believe they are getting an implant that’s been proven safe,” said Joshua Sharlin, a former FDA official who now is a consultant and expert witness in drug and medical device regulation. “No, it hasn’t,” Sharlin said.

And once those devices reach the marketplace, the FDA struggles to track malfunctions, including deaths and injuries — while injured patients face legal barriers trying to hold manufacturers accountable for product defects.

In a statement to ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News, the FDA said it “has a scientifically rigorous process to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices.”

‘Too Little, Too Late’

The FDA approved the MiniMed 670G insulin pump on Sept. 28, 2016, after its most stringent safety review, a little-used process known as premarket approval.

In a that day, Jeffrey Shuren, who directs the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, lauded the device as a “first-of-its-kind technology” that would give patients “greater freedom to live their lives” and to monitor and dispense insulin as needed. The pump was tested on 123 patients in a clinical trial over several months with “no serious adverse events,” the release said. Shuren declined to be interviewed.

The FDA’s enthusiasm didn’t last. In November 2019, Medtronic, citing the ring problem, launched an “” of the pumps, which it expanded in late 2021.

During an inspection at Medtronic’s plant in Northridge, California, FDA officials learned the company had logged more than 74,000 ring complaints between 2016 and the November 2019 recall. More than 800 complaints weren’t investigated at all, according to the FDA, which sharply criticized the company in a December 2021 .

Medtronic is facing more than 60 lawsuits filed by injured patients and their families and the company believes it may be hit with claims for damages from thousands more patients, the company disclosed in an August Securities and Exchange Commission filing.

Medtronic pumps that allegedly dispensed too much, or too little, insulin have been blamed for contributing to at least a dozen patient deaths, according to lawsuits filed since 2019. Some cases have been settled under confidential terms, while others are pending or have been dismissed. Medtronic has denied any responsibility in response to the lawsuits.

In one pending case, a Las Vegas man using the pump allegedly fell into an “insulin-induced coma” that led to his death in 2020. In another 2020 case, a 67-year-old New Jersey resident collapsed at her home, dying later the same day at a local hospital.

The recall notice Medtronic sent to a 43-year-old Missouri man’s home arrived a few days after police found him dead on his bedroom floor, his family alleged in a lawsuit filed in August. “Simply too little, too late,” the suit reads. The case is pending, and Medtronic has yet to file an answer in court.

Medtronic declined to answer written questions from ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News about the pumps and court cases. In an emailed statement, the company said it replaced pump rings with new ones “redesigned to reduce the risk of damage” and “fulfilled all pump replacement requests at no cost to customers.”

In April, that the FDA had lifted the warning letter a few days after it of the MiniMed pump system.

Shortcut to Market

The 1976 federal law that mandated safety testing for high-risk medical devices also created a far easier — and less costly — pathway to the marketplace. This process, known as a 510(k) clearance, requires manufacturers to show a new device they plan to sell has “substantial equivalence” to one already on the market, even if the prior product has been recalled.

Critics have worried for years that the 510(k)-approval scenario is too industry-friendly to protect patients from harm.

In July 2011, an concluded that 510(k) was “not intended to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices” and said “a move away from the 510(k) clearance process should occur as soon as reasonably possible.”

More than a decade later, that hasn’t happened, even amid over the clearance of hundreds of devices that employ artificial intelligence.

The FDA now clears about 3,000 low- to moderate-risk devices every year through 510(k) review, which costs the device maker a standard FDA fee of about $22,000. That compares with about 30 approvals a year through the stricter premarketing requirements, which cost nearly $500,000 per device, according to FDA data. Diana Zuckerman, president of the National Center for Health Research, said even many doctors don’t realize devices cleared for sale typically have not undergone clinical trials to establish their safety.

“Doctors are shocked to learn this,” she said. “Patients aren’t going to know it when their doctors don’t.”

In response to written questions from ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News, the FDA said it “continues to believe in the merits of the 510(k) program and will continue to work to identify program improvements that strengthen the safety and effectiveness of 510(k) cleared devices.” The FDA keeps a tight lid on data showing which devices manufacturers choose to demonstrate substantial equivalence — what the agency refers to as “predicate” devices.

“We can’t get detailed data,” said Sandra Rothenberg, a researcher at the Rochester Institute of Technology. “It’s very hard for researchers to determine the basis on which substantial equivalence is being made and to analyze if there are problems.”

Rothenberg cited the history of “” artificial hip implants, which under 510(k) spawned many new brands — along with a of patient injuries. The implants could release metal particles that damaged bone and led to premature removal and replacement, a painful operation. Just four of these hip devices have been the target of more than 25,000 lawsuits seeking damages, court records show. In early 2016, the FDA requiring safety testing before approving new metal-on-metal hip devices.

Alarm Bells

Two former Medtronic sales executives in California argue in a whistleblower lawsuit that the 510(k) process can be abused.

According to the whistleblowers, the FDA approved the Puritan Bennett 980, or PB 980, ventilator in 2014 based on the assertion it was substantially equivalent to the PB 840, an earlier mechanical ventilator long viewed as the workhorse of the industry.

Medtronic’s subsidiary company Covidien made its claim even though the device has completely different “guts” and operates using software and other “substantially different” mechanisms, according to the whistleblowers’ suit.

In response, Medtronic said it “believes the allegations are without merit and has moved to dismiss the case.” The case is pending.

The whistleblowers argue the PB 980 ventilator was plagued by dangerous malfunctions for years before its recall in late 2021.

One ventilator billowed smoke in an intensive care unit while the whistleblowers were told by one hospital that “the wheels for the ventilator cart may actually fall off the ventilator during transport,” according to the suit.

Batteries could die without warning, kicking off a scramble to keep patients alive; monitor screens froze up repeatedly or otherwise went on the blink; and, in several cases, alarm bells warning of a patient emergency rang continuously and could be quieted only by unplugging the unit from the wall socket and pulling out its batteries, according to the suit.

The of the PB 980 cited a “manufacturing assembly error” that the company said may cause the ventilator to become “inoperable.”

Medtronic said in an email that the ventilator “has helped thousands of patients around the world,” including playing a “critical role in the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic.”

Late Warnings

The FDA operates a massive , to alert regulators and the public to emerging device dangers. The FDA requires manufacturers to advise the agency when they learn their device may have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury, or malfunctioned in a way that might recur and cause harm. These reports must be submitted within 30 days unless a special exemption is granted.

But FDA officials acknowledge that many serious adverse events go unreported — just how many is anybody’s guess.

Since 2010, the FDA has cited companies more than 5,000 times for not handling, reviewing, or investigating complaints properly, or for not reporting adverse events on time. For instance, the FDA cited an Ohio company that made electric beds and other devices more than 15 times for failing to properly scrutinize complaints or report adverse events, including the death of a patient who allegedly became trapped between a bedrail and mattress, agency records show.

In about 10% of reports, more than a year or two elapsed from when a death or serious injury occurred and when the FDA received the reports, a ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News analysis found. That works out to nearly 60,000 delayed reports a year.

Experts and lawmakers say the FDA needs to find a way to detect safety problems quicker.

Sens. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) to persuade the agency to add unique device identifiers to Medicare payment claim forms to help track products that fail. In an email statement to ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News, Grassley called that a “commonsense step we can take up front to mitigate risk, improve certainty and save money later.”

The FDA said it is working to “strike the right balance between assuring safety and fostering device innovation and patient access.” Yet it noted: “Additional resources are required to establish a fully functioning active surveillance system for medical devices.” For now, injured patients suing device companies often cite the volume of adverse event reports to MAUDE, or FDA citations for failing to report them, to bolster claims that the company knew about product malfunctions but failed to correct them.

In one case, a New York man is suing manufacturer Boston Scientific, claiming injuries from a device called the AMS 800 that is used to treat stress urinary incontinence.

Though Boston Scientific says on its website that 200,000 men have been treated successfully, the lawsuit argues complaints piled up in MAUDE year after year and no action was taken — by the company or by regulators.

The number of complaints filed soared from six in 2016 to 2,753 in 2019, according to the suit. By far, the largest category involved incontinence, the condition the device was supposed to fix, according to the suit. Boston Scientific did not respond to a request for comment. The company has filed a motion to dismiss the case, which is pending.

By the FDA’s own count, more than 57,000 of some 74,000 complaints Medtronic received about the MiniMed insulin pump’s retainer rings were reported to the agency. The FDA said the complaints “were part of the information that led to the compliance actions.” The agency said it “ to the retainer ring to correct this issue” and “has reviewed information confirming the effectiveness of the modification.”

“What is the threshold for the FDA to step in and do something?” said Mara Schwartz, who is a nurse, diabetes educator, and pump user. “How many deaths or adverse events does there have to be?”

In 2020, she sued Medtronic, alleging she suffered seizures when the pump mistakenly delivered an overdose of insulin. Medtronic denied her claims, and the case has since been settled under confidential terms.

Private Eyes

Some countries don’t trust the device industry to play such a key role in oversight.

Australia and about a dozen other nations maintain registries that measure the performance of medical devices against competitors, with an eye toward not paying for care for a substandard device.

That’s not likely to happen in the United States, where no device or drug manufacturer must demonstrate its new product is better than what’s already for sale.

Product liability lawsuits in the U.S. often cite troubling findings from overseas. For instance, registries in Australia and other countries pinpointed durability problems with the Optetrak knee implants manufactured by Florida device company Exactech years before a major recall. Exactech has declined comment.

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The Australian surveillance network also detected deficiencies with the Medtronic PB 980 ventilator, prompting the country’s health authority to suspend its use for six months until Medtronic completed training for health care workers and took other steps to improve it, court records show. Medtronic told ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News that it had “worked closely” with the Australian group to resolve the problems. “We take patient safety very seriously and have processes to identify quality issues and determine appropriate actions,” Medtronic said.

Registries have gained some traction in America. But so far, they typically have been controlled, and sometimes funded, by industry and medical specialty groups that share their findings only with doctors.

One private registry managed by the Society of Thoracic Surgeons, , tracks death and injury rates at 180 hospitals in the United States certified to implant a mechanical heart pump known as an LVAD. Some patients might find that information helpful, but it’s not available to them.

‘Exciting Features’

While the FDA clears thousands of devices for use based on the “substantial equivalence” premise, manufacturers often tout “new and exciting features” in their advertising and other marketing, said Alexander Everhart, a researcher at the Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis.

These marketing campaigns have long been controversial, especially when they rely partly on wining and dining surgeons and other medical professionals to gain new business, or when surgeons have financial ties to manufacturers whose products they use. Orthopedic device makers have funneled billions of dollars to surgeons, including fees for consulting, doing medical research, or royalties for their role in fine-tuning surgical tools and techniques, even promoting the products to their peers.

Marketing campaigns directed at prospective patients may receive little scrutiny. The FDA has “limited resources to actively monitor the volume of direct-to-consumer advertising,” according to a issued in September. From 2018 to 2022, the FDA took 255 enforcement actions involving advertising claims made for devices, according to the GAO report.

Legal Barriers

While manufacturers can advertise devices directly to patients, courts may not hold them accountable for communicating possible risks to patients.

Consider the case of Richard Greisberg, a retired electronics business owner in New Jersey. He sued Boston Scientific in 2019, years after having a Greenfield vena cava filter implanted. The device is intended to prevent blood clots that develop in the lower body from traveling into the lungs, which can be deadly.

Greisberg argued that the device had migrated in his body, causing pain and other symptoms and damage that took years to identify. Representing himself in court, he tried to argue that nobody had told him that could happen and that if they had done so he wouldn’t have agreed to the procedure.

He lost when the judge cited a legal doctrine called “learned intermediary.” The doctrine, which is recognized in many states, holds that manufacturers must warn only physicians, who are presumed to have the knowledge to understand a medical device’s risks and relay them to patients.

The court ruled that a 27-page manual the manufacturer sent to the physician who implanted it, which included details about possible risks, was adequate and tossed the case.

Greisberg, 81, felt sucker-punched. “They never gave me any warning about what could happen down the road,” he said in an interview. “I never had a chance to have my day in court.”

The family of PeeWee Gautney also faces challenges pursuing the insulin pump lawsuit.

Gautney died in a motel room in Destin, Florida, a day after riding his Harley-Davidson to the Panhandle beach town on a weekend jaunt. The MiniMed pump was still strapped to his body, according to a police report.

Medtronic had sent Gautney a form letter in late March 2020, less than two months before he died, advising him to make sure the ring was locking in place correctly. A week later, he wrote back, telling the company: “It’s fine right now,” court records show.

Wiggins, 33, his daughter, who is also a neonatal respiratory therapist, said she believes a crack in the retainer ring caused it to release too much insulin, which her dad may not have recognized.

“It should never be put on the patient to determine if there is a problem,” Wiggins said.

Medtronic has denied the pump failed and caused Gautney’s death. The FDA approved the device knowing patients faced the risk of it administering wrong doses, but believed the benefits outweighed these risks, Medtronic argued in a motion for summary judgment in September. The motion is pending.

Medtronic also cited a legal doctrine holding that Congress granted the FDA sole oversight authority over devices receiving premarket approval, which preempts any product defect claims brought under state laws. Manufacturers have drawn on the preemption defense to sidestep liability for patient injuries, and often win dismissal, though federal courts are split in applying the doctrine.

Wiggins hopes to beat those odds, arguing that the December 2021 FDA warning letter reveals that Medtronic violated safety and manufacturing standards.

Her lawyer, Scott Murphy, said that insulin pumps are “really wonderful” devices for people with diabetes when they work right. He argues that the FDA records confirm that Medtronic significantly downplayed its pump’s hazards.

“The risks get minimized and the benefits exaggerated,” he said.

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The 68-year-old Wisconsin farmer chose the pump, called a HeartMate 3 — currently the only FDA-approved device of its kind in use. Instead of extending his life, though, the device led to his death, according to a lawsuit filed in December 2020 by his daughter Jamie Edwards.

The lawsuit alleged that Herrman died because a defect in the locking mechanism of the HeartMate 3 prevented the device from sealing, causing multiple strokes and leading to a severe brain injury and multiorgan failure. Herrman “could not have anticipated the danger this defect … created for him,” the lawsuit said.

Herrman’s death to a Food and Drug Administration database where the public can learn about device-related deaths, serious injuries, and malfunctions. The in the peer-reviewed Journal of Heart and Lung Transplantation.

In September 2021, Ramon Flores Sr. had at Methodist Hospital of San Antonio. A lawsuit his family filed in August alleges that the locking mechanism defect led to air embolism strokes. Flores died eight days after surgery, at age 76.

“How many other people is this going to happen to?” said his daughter, Alanna Flores Blanco, 52. “We never, ever were explained that the device could malfunction and this could happen.”

After the deaths of Herrman and Flores, Thoratec Corp., the device’s manufacturer, evaluated the pumps involved. In , Thoratec, a subsidiary of Abbott Laboratories, confirmed a bent locking arm. But “a direct correlation” between the HeartMate 3 and the deaths “could not conclusively be established,” the manufacturer reported to the FDA.

Abbott did not respond to questions about the deaths or the alleged defects. The manufacturer denied liability in both cases. It settled Herrman’s lawsuit this fall, and the Flores case is ongoing.

The men’s deaths are among more than 4,500 reports since August 2017 in which the HeartMate 3 may have caused or contributed to a patient’s death, according to a ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News analysis of the FDA’s database of medical device incidents, known as the , or MAUDE. Hospitals, doctors, and others report device-related deaths, serious injuries, and malfunctions to manufacturers, who are and report cases to the FDA.

In nearly 90% of those 4,500-plus reports, Thoratec said it found no problem with the device or how it was used, according to a ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News review of the FDA database.

In cases where Abbott finds the HeartMate 3 did not cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, the company files “corrective reports,” said Justin Paquette, an Abbott public affairs director.

He added, “The complexity of the device – combined with patients battling late stage heart failure and associated comorbidities – creates very dynamic clinical care situations.”

Abbott said the HeartMate 3 is the safest iteration yet of any left ventricular assist device, or LVAD, a type of mechanical heart pump and refined over the last six decades.

The HeartMate 3 was first approved by the FDA, for use in patients awaiting a heart transplant, in August 2017, and one year later it was approved as a long-term therapy. The device is often considered only for patients with end-stage heart failure, and even then it is a last resort.

HeartMate 3 has “dramatically improved the safety of LVADs by reducing rates of complications that had historically challenged heart pump technology, including clotting, stroke and bleeding,” Paquette said.

As recently as August, the FDA also expressed support for the device. “The FDA believes the benefits of HeartMate 3 continue to outweigh the risks for this vulnerable patient population with few available alternatives,” said Jeremy Kahn, an agency spokesperson.

Others aren’t so sure. Former FDA medical device official Madris Kinard sees the high number of death reports as a warning.

“To me this is a safety signal and it’s hard to know if the FDA is working on something to address it,” said Kinard, founder of , a company that makes FDA device data more user-friendly for hospitals, law firms, investors, and others. “You have to wonder why [death reports are] still happening, and at the same rate.”

, a former director in the FDA’s medical device office, agrees the death reports for HeartMate 3 need more study. “The FDA may be missing some signals,” he said. Perhaps “there’s a little more here than meets the eye.”

Not all device problems are reported to MAUDE, and submitting a report is not necessarily an admission that a device caused a death or a serious injury. Device problem reports can be inaccurate or incomplete, or lack verification, and a single incident may be reported more than once — or not at all.

Those limitations ultimately can leave patients and their caregivers uninformed about risks associated with a device such as the HeartMate 3, said , a cardiologist and expert in medical device safety and regulation at the University of California-San Francisco.

“They’re making perhaps the biggest decision of their lives: Do I proceed with an LVAD or not? And even if I proceed, what are the risks I’m facing?” he said. “And they are left with incomplete data and uncertainty about how to make that determination.”

Even doctors cannot use the FDA database as a tool to effectively counsel patients, Dhruva added.

“lf you don’t know what is a real safety signal and what’s not,” he said, “then how can that information help us to calibrate our benefits-and-risks discussion with patients?”

Tracking Incident Reports

The HeartMate 3 is not the only device whose safety profile is hard to ascertain in MAUDE, Dhruva said. The information in the FDA database is insufficient to give patients an adequate understanding of any medical device’s safety risks and reflects “the overall weakness of postmarket surveillance” after a device has been approved for sale, he said.

Under federal regulations, device manufacturers typically adverse events to the FDA within 30 days of learning about them, and that data is often used by researchers and regulators to identify potential safety concerns. Reports also can be by doctors, patients, or others. The FDA says that reports if the manufacturer determines that a device did not cause or contribute to an adverse event.

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But with millions of reports for thousands of devices, it can be difficult to detect and prevent problems that put patients at risk.

Hospitals and surgeons also might self-censor what they report to manufacturers due to concerns about being sued, said Kessler, now a professor at the University of Washington.

“Health care facilities, and risk managers in particular, they aren’t always forthcoming with detailed data about events,” he said.

Reports in MAUDE show that patients with a HeartMate 3 have experienced adverse events, such as bleeding, infection, and respiratory failure, that the manufacturer warned were possible in its .

About 400 reports cited infusion or flow problems with the HeartMate 3. In thousands of other cases, the manufacturer said it did not observe any problems with the device, making it even more difficult for a doctor or a patient’s family to understand the safety history of the product.

Reports in MAUDE also describe fatal incidents due to complications not mentioned in the manufacturer’s instructions, such as the locking mechanism malfunction. In one report, a patient after an external battery charger caught fire.

Each report in MAUDE has dozens of data points and summaries describing what happened. What’s lacking in the database: context and details that would be useful for patients and doctors, such as the total number of devices in use and the name of the hospital where the event occurred.

Flores Blanco had never heard of MAUDE before her father’s surgery. Even if she had, it’s unlikely she would have found a locking mechanism issue amid the morass of records, much less anticipated what might happen.

Missed Signals?

A routine FDA inspection of Abbott’s manufacturing plant in 2017 showed that Thoratec had fallen behind schedule reporting adverse events, according to agency records obtained by ºÚÁϳԹÏÍø News under a Freedom of Information Act request.

The company updated training and hired additional staff to handle complaints submitted by hospitals, doctors, patients, and others, according to an inspection report. It provided the FDA inspector with “quantitative evidence” that late reporting to the FDA had decreased.

By October 2020, during a follow-up inspection, Thoratec was using a database to enter and process complaints and submit device reports electronically, according to an inspection report.

FDA inspectors did not cite any deficiencies with how Thoratec handled complaints after the visit. Inspectors noted the company had received 8,115 complaints related to the HeartMate 3 during the 12 months prior to the inspection in October 2020, the records show.

It’s not clear what the complaints concerned. Abbott did not respond when asked how many of the complaints led to an adverse event report to the FDA.

In Kinard’s view, device-makers in general often take longer than 30 days to investigate the root cause of an incident and frequently conclude that an adverse event was due to user error.

“They are using this regularly to downplay the problems with the device,” she said.

In Herrman’s case, a Thoratec representative was in the operating room and witnessed the incident, according to a deposition in the lawsuit. The company submitted a report to the FDA about Herrman’s injury within 30 days of the June 2019 incident.

Herrman’s surgeon, , was experienced at implanting the device, according to the lawsuit, and he was also a principal investigator on the clinical trial that brought the HeartMate 3 to market. Stulak did not respond to interview requests. But, in 2020, he and two Mayo Clinic colleagues described Herrman’s case in The Journal of Heart and Lung Transplantation, where they noted the locking mechanism malfunction. “The lack of a tight seal from this defect resulted in the multiple subsequent air embolism events and irrecoverable neurological damage,” they wrote.

The article describes how Stulak replaced the device with a new one, but it was too late to prevent the injuries to Herrman. Thoratec submitted at least three follow-up reports to the FDA about the incident and said its investigation could not determine whether the HeartMate 3 caused Herrman’s death.

Herrman’s death certificate cites complications of ischemic heart disease. Flores’ death certificate says he died of cardiac arrest and hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy, or brain damage.

The FDA has had its own problems keeping the MAUDE database up to date.

The agency is years behind schedule on anonymizing and releasing adverse event reports for all medical devices.

Kinard said the FDA has yet to publicly release “millions” of follow-up reports that manufacturers have filed after their initial adverse event report for a medical device.

The FDA acknowledged that the agency is not up to date on public reporting but could not say how many reports are pending — for the HeartMate 3 or any device.

“We are currently working on redaction for public posting in MAUDE, of all supplemental reports dated 2021-2023,” said Kahn, the FDA spokesperson. “It is difficult to determine how many of those – pending redaction of supplemental reports – pertain to the subject device.”

FDA press officer Lauren-Jei McCarthy noted that, besides adverse event reports, the agency also monitors published literature, patients, patient advocacy groups, professional societies, individual health care providers, and other sources to determine whether further action is warranted.

“We review and take seriously all reports of adverse events associated with medical devices,” McCarthy said. She said patients and providers who use the HeartMate 3 “remain a high priority” and that the agency cannot comment on investigations.

A Last-Resort Treatment

Before he got a HeartMate 3 implanted in January 2022, Sid Covington, of Austin, Texas, said he had researched the device during years of medication therapy and cardiac rehabilitation to treat his congestive heart failure.

“I looked at case studies. I looked at a number of the different heart studies,” Covington said. “I looked at their marketing brochures and all that stuff, just whatever I could find.”

Covington, 76, said he was familiar with MAUDE and Intermacs, a private registry that tracks LVAD patients, but didn’t consult them. When he had to decide whether to get the device, he was in the hospital with chest pain, shortness of breath, and fatigue from advanced heart failure. Covington said his only option was the HeartMate 3.

“When it comes down to the moment, you really don’t have much choice,” he said. “It’s any port in the storm at that point.”

The HeartMate 3 requires constant attention and care from patients, who must keep the external parts of the device dry at all times and avoid jumping and contact sports. Patients must also ensure that it always has an external source of power, which is supplied through a cord attached to the pump that exits the body through a surgical opening.

Patients who get the device are often out of options to treat their end-stage heart failure, said , a cardiologist with the University of Colorado and member of a multidisciplinary medical team that cares for heart failure patients.

“We wouldn’t proceed with an LVAD unless we think the risk of death is really high and we’ve tried everything else,” he said.

That informs the regulatory view, too, Kessler said.

“When you’re talking about people who are seriously ill, then the FDA will accept a potentially higher risk,” he said, “but not an irresponsible one, and certainly not one that couldn’t be communicated to clinicians and the public.”

Allen, who helped for patients considering an LVAD, said reliable data on safety and risks to patients is key.

“It’s about as high-risk, high-reward a choice as there can be,” Allen said. “It’s a really complicated decision to make and I think standard informed consent approaches are really inadequate for fully understanding that.”

Data Exists but Is Confidential

Long-term data for the HeartMate 3 — including performance metrics for the certified to implant the device — are kept in Intermacs, managed by , which has promised to provide transparency but has yet to deliver.

The registry tracks mortality and injury rates for patients with an LVAD and logs the number of devices implanted each year.

But Intermacs is proprietary, and access at hospitals requires a principal investigator and at least one trained staff member, who can use the data to evaluate their facility’s performance against an aggregate from their peers across the nation.

, a heart transplant and LVAD surgeon at University of Michigan Health, leads a medical society task force that oversees Intermacs. He said 12,000 to 14,000 HeartMate 3 implants have been recorded in Intermacs since 2017. The HeartMate 3 has “the best outcomes of any other LVAD, ever,” he said.

Over the years, federal regulators have made it easier for patients to access LVADs, for implant centers and to be on a transplant waiting list to receive one of the pumps.

Though the HeartMate 3 is presently the only LVAD being implanted in the United States, it once had a competitor, Medtronic’s HeartWare, which the manufacturer in June 2021, citing a high risk of stroke and pumps failing to restart if stopped.

While the FDA provides consumers with about key clinical trials supporting the approval of new drugs, the agency provides no comparable data for medical devices. And though Medicare reimburses hospitals nearly $200,000 for most HeartMate 3 implants, federal administrators do not track patient outcomes or enforce performance standards for the heart pumps.

, a cardiac surgeon and researcher, was the principal investigator for Intermacs when the FDA, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute awarded a contract to the University of Alabama at Birmingham to .

Federal agencies paid about $15 million over 10 years for Intermacs, Kirklin said, because they wanted to better understand the risk factors for death and other adverse events with so-called mechanical circulatory support devices, including LVADs, as well as the factors that indicated a higher likelihood of patients doing well on the pumps.

The FDA monitors annual reports of Intermacs data, including adverse events, and allows companies to use the registry’s data to analyze their devices’ performance and to fulfill reporting requirements after a device enters the market.

LVAD implant centers are required to report their data to Intermacs in order to be certified by the accrediting nonprofit The Joint Commission. And while CMS requires that centers implant at least 10 devices every three years to continue receiving Medicare reimbursement, there are no requirements for outcomes or other quality metrics. CMS does not track LVAD patient outcomes at individual facilities, said Sara Lonardo, CMS press secretary at the time.

Kirklin said he is working with The Society of Thoracic Surgeons to create a risk model that would allow the public to see quality scores for individual hospitals that implant LVADs, a need the group has . But it will be a year before the tool is ready.

Kirklin and Pagani said the number of death reports for the HeartMate 3 in the FDA’s MAUDE database can be misleading without the outcome and longitudinal perspective that Intermacs provides.

“When you see a lot of deaths it means, ‘Let’s investigate.’ I couldn’t agree more,” Kirklin said. “But it’s rather limited. It’s not time-related and you don’t know the denominator. If you look up Intermacs, it’s all there.”

The families of Herrman and Flores filed lawsuits, in part, to find out what went wrong. Herrman’s family settled the lawsuit and agreed to confidentiality. Thoratec has filed a motion to dismiss the ongoing Flores case based on the FDA’s approval of the device.

Alanna Flores Blanco said she and her father were aware of the HeartMate 3’s positive outcomes, including that shows those who receive the device have a better than 50% chance of living five years or more.

“That’s why he took the chance to do it,” she said.

Flores Blanco said her father was a model patient, meeting regularly with cardiologists and other specialists, attending classes to learn how to live with the device, and receiving approval for surgery from the medical review board at Methodist Hospital in San Antonio.

The family felt informed and her father was prepared, she said.

“He did everything he was supposed to do,” she said. “What failed him ultimately was that device.”

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